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This paper discusses whether the parameter invariance problem as in Lucas
(1976) applies to the standard new Keynesian DSGE model when the credit chan-
nel is left out from its structure. We simulate a nancial crisis in which the credit
market friction is positive and we shift the monetary policy to stimulate the econ-
omy. We evaluate the cost of omitting the credit channel by examining the changes
of the estimated model parameters and by using policy outcomes. We nd that
although some parameters incur nontrivial changes after the policy shift, overall
these parameter changes have little impact on the conduct of monetary policy.
Keywords: DSGE model, Lucas Critique, Bayesian estimation, Financial Accel-
erator model




Lucas (1976) once said that any model should be structural so that the hypothetical
policy shift does not trigger any spurious shift in model parameters, otherwise the model
does not serve well in policy discussions. Soon after, the analytical tool known as the
Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model was developed and has become
the workhorse for analyzing the aggregate economy. Unlike previous generations of mod-
els, its behavioral equations characterizing model variables are derived from an optimizing
principle, and further pinned down by structural parameters that describe preferences and
technology of agents. Today, many researchers have come to embrace DSGE models as
a practical solution to the Lucasabove critique and many central banks have developed
their own versions of the DSGE model that closely resemble their national economy.
The nancial crisis in 2008 has brought fresh criticism to DSGE models for the lack of
credit channel. The credit channel here refers to monetary policy transmission process
through the supply of loanable funds. Prior to the nancial crisis, it was customary for
central banks to introduce the credit channel in an informal manner, in which arbitrary
dynamic equations served as proxies for short-run e¤ects such as credit constraints,
house price e¤ects, condence and accelerator e¤ects(Harrison et al., 2005).1 After the
nancial crisis, many central banks have started to incorporate the credit channel into
its core structure. Such renement was largely regarded as a positive move because these
models can explicitly analyze the workings of the credit channel providing accuracy to
policy discussions. But there are also skepticism on whether such modications would
necessarily change our view on how monetary policy should be conducted.2 The cost
of using a misspecied DSGE model is that it could mislead policymakers to adopt a
suboptimal policy to stabilize the economy. However if the magnitude of the cost is trivial
in an economic sense, policymakers might still prefer to use the simpler DSGE model e.g.
Calvo (1983) and Yun (1996), especially when they do not have complete condence in
1See also Bayoumi et al. (2004), Coenen et al. (2007), and Erceg et al. (2006).
2For more discussion on this topic, see for example Faust (2012), Caballero (2010).
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how the credit channel works in practice and / or how it should be modelled.
The objective of this paper is to assess the potential cost of using a DSGE model that
does not feature the credit channel at its core (=approximating model). We assume
the policymaker is ignorant of the credit channel in the true model economy (=data-
generating model). The policymaker uses an approximating model that does not feature
the credit channel to estimate model parameters. We then examine how the parameter
estimates obtained from the approximating model are individually a¤ected by a policy
shift and how these parameter changes a¤ect the overall policy outcome if the policymaker
were to design its policy based on the estimated parameters. We evaluate the direct cost
in two ways: (a) magnitude of the changes in the estimated parameters, and (b) the
resulting destabilization of ination and output caused by parameter changes. We also
evaluate how large the opportunity cost of using a misspecied model is, relative to
the correctly-specied credit channel model.
For our benchmark data-generating model we choose the Financial Accelerator model
of Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999). The main reason for this model choice is its
wide use among policymakers and academics, making our work relevant to a broader set
of models and applications.3 The model also has a transparent structure because the
credit channel mechanism is captured by a single structural parameter that measures
the degree of the credit market friction. When this parameter is set to zero, the credit
channel is e¤ectively shut o¤ and the nancial accelerator model becomes isomorphic to
the simple new Keynesian model that we use as our approximating model. Thus any
parameter instability detected in the approximating model can be fully attributed to the
credit channel misspecication.
The main ndings are summarized as follows. First, two of the estimated parame-
ters, i.e. labor supply elasticity and price stickiness, exhibit economically non-trivial
3In 2008, Federal Reserve governor Mishkin stated that the nancial accelerator mechanism describes
well the macroeconomic risk that the monetary policymaker faces (Mishkin, 2008), and since then many
central banks such as the European Central Bank, the Bundesbank, the Riksbank have formally incorpo-
rated the credit channel as in Bernanke et al. (1999) into their DSGE models. For works in the academic
literature, see for example Goodfriend and McCallum (2007) and Iacoviello (2005).
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changes before and after the policy shift, but the remaining parameters remain relatively
unchanged. Second, we nd that parameter changes as a whole have a relatively small
e¤ect on policy outcomes evaluated using either the approximating model or the data-
generating model. Our result indicates that the misspecication itself does not alter the
policymakers belief about their own policy outcomes and that the misspecication does
not mislead the policymaker to pick a worse policy evaluated based on the (unknown)
credit channel model economy. However, the policymaker could perform much better if it
were to use the correctly specied credit channel model because the opportunity cost of
not using the right model is found to be much larger than the direct cost obtained solely
based on parameter changes. Our ndings are robust under di¤erent degrees of credit
market frictions and with alternative data-generating models.
This paper adds to the growing literature that studies the link between parameter
invariance problem and model misspecications. While works such as Chang, Kim, and
Schorfheide (2010), Cogley and Yagihashi (2010), Leeper and Sims (1994), Lubik and
Surico (2010), and Rudebusch (2005) all have studied this problem from di¤erent angles,
no one has examined the cost of parameter invariance problem in the context of the credit
channel. This paper intends to ll in the gap.
The next section explains the models in detail. We present in the third section the
main results with regard to parameter changes and discuss its policy implications. The
fourth section conducts the robustness checks. The last section concludes.
2 The Model
The data-generating model closely follows the Financial Accelerator model (FA-DGM)
of Bernanke et al. (1999). We rst describe the basic structure of the FA model and
highlight the di¤erences with the simpler new Keynesian approximating model (NK-AM).
We then explain how the monetary policy shift is modeled. After calibrating the structural
parameters, we compute the equilibrium.
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2.1 Financial Intermediary and Entrepreneur
In the FA-DGM, there is imperfection in the capital market that generates a risk premium
between the return on capital (Rk) and the risk-free interest rate (R). A risk-neutral
nancial intermediary collects funds from the representative household, then lends out to
individual entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs use these funds to buy capital (K) from capital
producers and rent them out to intermediate goods producers. The demand for loanable









where EtRkt+1 is the ex ante return on capital,MPK is the marginal product of capital, Q
is the capital price, and  is the depreciation rate of capital. Equation (1) states that the
demand for loanable funds is implicitly determined by the sum of rental rate of capital
and the direct gain of holding the capital.
Entrepreneurs are subject to the risk of insolvency through the idiosyncratic produc-
tivity disturbance. This disturbance is randomly distributed across entrepreneurs and a
low realization makes entrepreneurs unable to repay their loan. The representative nan-
cial intermediary cannot tell which entrepreneur becomes insolvent until the loan payment
stops, in which case, the nancial intermediary collects all that is left to the entrepreneurs
capital by paying the agency cost AC associated with liquidation of asset. The optimal
contract problem can be formulated as the entrepreneursprot maximization problem
subject to a nancial intermediarys participation condition. Solving this problem results











where v is the credit market friction that is calculated using several model parameters,
such as the unit agency cost. N is the net worth of the entrepreneur, which accumulates











+W et ; (3)
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whereW e is entrepreneursincome and  is entrepreneursconstant probability of surviv-
ing to the next period.4 Equation (2) states that the more leveraged entrepreneurs are in
nancing their investment, the larger the nancial premium Rk=R has to be, so that the
nancial intermediary can cover the increased cost of insolvency.
In the context of our experiment, the credit channel misspecication is captured in
Equation (1) and (2). In the NK-AM, the credit market friction is nonexistent and the
return on capital equals the risk-free rate at all times. Thus the demand for loanable
funds can be written as
Rt+1 = Et





whereas the supply of loanable funds in the NK-AM is replaced by the consumption Euler
equation derived from the representative households optimal saving decision.
2.2 Monetary Policymaker
In the DSGE literature, the preferred method of modeling monetary policy is the Taylor
rule (Taylor, 1993) that has reaction coe¢ cients on pre-selected endogenous variables. We
extend the rule by adding target ination as an additional policy parameter. In recent
years, policymakers and academics have discussed about the possible shift of the target
ination as a way to stimulate the economy.5 Our modication allows this type of policy
shift to be analyzed within the otherwise conventional model framework.6
In our model, monetary policy is determined in two steps. The policymaker rst
chooses a particular level of target ination, then chooses the Taylor rule coe¢ cients in
order to minimize the (discounted) sum of expected variances for output and ination.
More specically, the reaction coe¢ cients ; Y in the Taylor rule are chosen as follows
Rnt+1 = (t)
 (Yt)
Y exp (em;t) ;
4Entrepreneurial income is introduced to assure that entrepreneurs always enter the economy with
positive wealth.
5See for example Bakhshi et al. (2007), Blanchard et al. (2010), Evans (2011), Sahuc (2006), and
Williams (2009).
6We note that this modication is not intended to replicate the unconventionalmonetary policy
by the Fed that took place in the recent years. To keep Taylor rule functional, we assume that the









where Rnt+1 is the nominal interest rate that is chosen at time t,  t = [ct; bYt]0 is the vector
of ination and output, and em;t  N(0; 2m) is a monetary policy shock. WL0 is the
loss measure which approximates the policymakers objective of stabilizing the economy
both today as well as in the future.7 All the structural equations in the model serve as
additional constraints in this optimization problem. Further details on how to compute
; Y are provided in Appendix A.
One consequence of allowing policymakers to target ination is that its expansionary
monetary policy can a¤ect the economy through aggregate supply as well as through
demand. This is because target ination appears in the aggregate supply equation known
as the (new Keynesian) Phillips curve. Following the new Keynesian literature, we assume
that rms face a xed probability  of not being able to adjust their price in a given time


























where  is the elasticity of demand, MC is the marginal cost, Y is the aggregate output,
j;t+j is the j -period stochastic discount factor. Linearizing equation (5) around the
steady state yields the following two equations in which model variables are expressed in
terms of deviation from the steady state
bt = Etbt+1 + dMCt + &  bCt   bYt
+&
h
(  1)Etbt+1 + Etbt+1i+ ecp;t; (6)
bt = 1   1bYt    bCt+  1 (  1)Etbt+1 + Etbt+1 ; (7)
where t  Pt=Pt 1 is the gross ination, C is consumption, ecp;t  N(0; 2cp) is the
cost push shock, and  is an auxiliary variable that captures the behavior of rmssto-









7We adopt this rather ad-hocdescription of the loss function to keep calculation of policy coe¢ cients
tractable.
8For more details on derivation, see Ascari and Ropele (2007).
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the slope of the Phillips curve, which is a decreasing function of target ination .
Intuitively, when the target ination is set higher, rms put less weight on the current
marginal cost in choosing their prices because they expect the general price level to rise
quickly over time. This makes the Phillips curve atter in aggregate.9 Under a at-
ter Phillips curve, an expansionary monetary policy shock of the same size will yield a
stronger output response.
Table 1 provides a numerical example on how the target ination a¤ects the coe¢ cients
; Y in the NK-AM using the calibrated parameter values (explain in the next section).
We observe that higher target ination always leads to smaller coe¢ cients for output and
ination. Also the loss measure in Equation (4) increases as the target ination is raised.
If the policymakers objective is to minimize the welfare loss in the long-run, the optimal
target ination would always be set to zero. Thus our loss measure can be interpreted as
the long-run cost of deviating from the optimal zero ination in exchange of stimulating
the economy in the short run.
2.3 Other Parts of the Model
Structural equations that describe the behavior of households, rms, and scal government
are commonly shared among the FA-DGM and NK-AM. Here we show these equations,
closely following the original specications in Bernanke et al. (1999).
The representative household chooses consumption Ct; labor supply Lt, and bond
holding Dt+1 to maximize its lifetime utility subject to a budget constraint. Solving the
utility maximization problem yields the standard consumption Euler and the intratem-









9When we apply our calibrated values to the model parameters, a 3% point increase in the the annual
target ination from 2% to 5% decreases  by 26% (0.31 to 0.23).
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where  is the subjective discount factor,  is the risk aversion,  is the labor supply
elasticity, and  is the weight of the disutility of labor in the household utility. Wt is the
real wage that is determined in a competitive factor market.
There are three types of rms and each of them involves in a di¤erent production
stage. The competitive capital producers purchase raw output I to produce capital goods
which are sold to entrepreneurs. In the production process, capital producers incur capital



















The intermediate goods producers, indexed as z in the unit interval, face monopolistic
competition in the market. Each producer hires labor and capital from an economy-wide







where  is the capital share of income. The aggregate technology shock A is modeled as,
At = (At 1)
A exp (eA;t) ;
eA;t  N(0; 2A):
Their pricing behavior is captured in the behavioral equation (5) as we saw in the previous
section.
The competitive nal good producers aggregate the intermediate goods produced by










Finally, the government expenditure shock is modeled as
Gt = (Gt 1)
G exp (eG;t) ;
eG;t  N(0; 2G):
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2.4 Calibration
The choice of private sector parameters largely follows the literature. Table 2 shows the
calibrated values for the parameters that exist in both the DGM and the AM. The labor
supply elasticity  is set to one. The price stickiness parameter  implies average price
nonadjustment of 6.7 months.
Table 3 shows the calibrated values for the parameters that are left out of estimation.10
Some of them are commonly used in the DGM / AM while others are only used in the
DGM. The discount factor  implies an annual real interest rate of 4.3%. The elasticity
of demand  implies a markup of 10% in the steady state. The government share of
output G=Y is set to match the historical average. We compute the credit market friction
parameter  following Bernanke et al. (1999) so that it reects the most recent data
during 1988Q1 - 2009Q2.11 We use a value of 0:073, which is slightly higher than that in
Bernanke et al. (1999).
Table 4 column (1) shows the policy parameters ; ; Y for the low ination policy.
Prior to the nancial crisis, the annual target ination is set to 2%, which is roughly the
annualized quarter-to-quarter PCE ination during the past two decades. Taylor rule
coe¢ cients are computed using the estimated parameter values in the pre-crisis period.12
The Taylor rule parameters are  = 4:05 and Y = 0:37. The values are in line with the
empirical literature that nds a large reaction to ination and a relatively muted reaction
to output gap in the pre-crisis period.13
Table 4 column (2) shows policy parameters for the reationary policy. The shift
from the low ination policy is modeled as a one-time, permanent, unanticipated shift in
10We do not calibrate the value for , because it does not play any role in explaining the dynamics of
the economy.
11First, time series of risk premium, default rate, and leverage ratio are constructed as in Yagihashi
(2011), then the averages of each series are calculated, and nally the structural parameters are chosen
so that the model-implied risk premium, default rate and leverage ratio match with those in the data.
12As we will see later in Table 7, estimates in the pre-crisis period is identical to the calibrated values
in Table 2. This is because the credit channel is shut o¤ ( = 0) and there will be no bias arising from
model misspecication.
13For example, Fernandez-Villaverde and Rubio-Ramirez (2007) report that  is in the range of 3.5
to 4.5 during 1980-2000 in the United States.
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the policy parameters, which means that a learning process is suppressed and immediate
convergence to a new rational expectations equilibrium is assumed. We choose the target
ination to be 5%. This number is from Fernandez-Villaverde and Rubio-Ramirez (2007)
that have estimated the implied target ination during the S&L crisis in the late 1980s.
The Taylor rule coe¢ cients are calculated using this new target ination as well as the
parameter estimates obtained after the crisis. Some of the parameter estimates have
changed from the original DGM values due to the credit channel misspecication. The
new policy coe¢ cients are  = 2:24 and Y = 0; notably smaller than those under the low
ination policy. Combining the results in Table 1 and Table 4 allows us to decompose
the overall policy shift into the target ination e¤ect and the estimated parameter e¤ects:
higher target ination alone results in the change in the Taylor rule coe¢ cients from
[; Y ] = [4:05; 0:37] to [; Y ] = [2:03; 0], whereas the estimated parameters e¤ect is
considerably smaller [; Y ] = [2:24; 0]. This indicates that much of the overall change
can be attributed to the change in the target ination.
2.5 Solving for the Equilibrium
The rational expectations equilibrium is obtained in three steps. First, we solve for the
models deterministic steady state. Second, the model equations are log-linearized around
the steady state and stacked into a system of linear expectational di¤erence equations.
Lastly, the system is solved to nd the approximate equilibrium law of motion.
Table 5 presents the key steady state values in both models. In the FA-DGM the
model implied annual capital output ratio is 1:6, whereas in the NK-AM the ratio is 2:1.
The larger capital output ratio in the latter reects the zero risk premium assumption,
which lowers the marginal product of capital and raises the capital output ratio in the
steady state. The di¤erence in the capital output ratio further causes the expenditure
shares of output in the steady state to di¤er.
To reconrm how the FA-DGM works under positive steady state ination, we subject
our model economy to the expansionary monetary policy shock and compare model out-
comes in three scenarios. In the rst scenario, we combine zero credit market friction with
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a low ination policy (= 2%). In the second scenario, we combine positive credit market
friction (= 0:073) with a low ination policy. The last scenario combines positive credit
market friction with a high ination policy (= 5%). To facilitate comparison, we keep the
Taylor rule coe¢ cients the same for all cases. Figure 1 shows the impulse responses for
selected variables.
There are visible di¤erences between the rst scenario and the second scenario. When
the credit market friction is present, an expansionary monetary policy shock lowers the
cost of both external and internal nancing, stimulating investment demand and raising
the price of capital. The increase in the price of capital further raises the net worth.
Because capital and net worth adjust sluggishly over time, the risk premium is kept low
in the future periods. The low risk premium implies lower cost of external nancing, which
further pushes up the investment demand. The model generates a positive feedback loop
known as the nancial accelerator e¤ect.
We also observe notable di¤erences between the second scenario and the third scenario.
In this case, the gaps in the impulse responses are purely generated through policy with
higher target ination. A higher target ination generates additional stimulus e¤ect
through a atter Phillips curve. This e¤ect is directly seen in the output response in
which the size of expansion is found to be large. Note that the model also generates a
muted response of ination under the reationary policy, which is expected from a atter
Phillips curve but the quantitative e¤ect is relatively small.
3 Results
3.1 Estimation Strategy
In order to assess the parameter invariance problem, we use the simulation method devel-
oped in Cogley and Yagihashi (2010). It assumes that the policymaker does not know the
FA-DGM and instead uses the NK-AM to interpret data emanating from the DGM. We
simulate three sets of data from the DGM: the oldsubsample with a zero credit market
friction, the newsubsample with a positive credit market friction and the same policy
12
parameters as in the oldsample, and the nalsubsample with a positive credit mar-
ket friction and a set of new policy parameters. The timing in the model is summarized
as follows:
1. Pre-crisis period: no credit market friction in the DGM, low ination policy, old
subsample is generated in the DGM, policymaker obtains the oldestimates using
the AM and computes the Taylor rule coe¢ cients based on these estimates.
2. Financial crisis happens: positive credit market friction in the DGM, low ination
policy, newsubsample is generated in the DGM, policymaker obtains the new
estimates using the AM. Taylor rule coe¢ cients are still kept the same as in step 1.
3. Policy shift: the policymaker adopts the high ination policy and computes the new
Taylor rule coe¢ cients based on the newestimates in step 2.
4. Post-policy shift: positive credit market friction in the DGM, high ination policy,
nal subsample is generated in the DGM, the policymaker obtains the nal
estimates using the AM.
The policymaker obtains parameter estimates by tting the AM to each of the
dataset generated through the DGM. More formally, the estimation can be stated as









where KLIC stands for the distance metric known as the Kullback-Leibler Information
Criterion.14 pi(Yji) represents the likelihood function for both models i = (DGM;AM),
and the vector Y represents endogenous variables common to both models, and i rep-
resents a vector of model-specic parameters that are partitioned into policy parameters
(poli ) and private sector parameters (
priv
i ). The Bayesian consistency theorem assures
that the estimates converge in probability to what is called the pseudo-true valueesti-
mates of the private sector parameters (bprivAM ) while treating policy parameters as known
14For more details on the consistency theorem, see the appendix in Gelman et al. (2000)
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constants.15 Due to the misspecication in the AM, there will always be an asymptotic
bias i.e. bprivAM 6= privDGM . These results are then used to assess to what extent the policy
shift is responsible for the changes in the estimated parameters.
To focus solely on the parameter invariance problem due to misspecication in the
credit channel, su¢ ciently long subsamples (500,000 periods) are generated.16 The large
sample size assures that the asymptotic standard errors are tiny, allowing us to focus on
how point estimates change across experiments.17 We choose output, ination, nominal
interest rate, and consumption as observables that are available to the policymaker.
The number of observables is matched to the number of structural shocks in the AM to
avoid stochastic singularity.
The structural parameters are estimated by maximizing the posterior kernel density
that involves the Bayesian prior. The role of prior is to facilitate computation by introduc-
ing curvatures into the likelihood function.18 Table 6 summarizes the priors for individual
parameters. The prior distributions are chosen so that they respect the domain of original
parameters. The standard deviations of the priors are intentionally set loosely so that the
estimates can quickly converge to the pseudo-truevalues.
3.2 Parameter Estimates: Before and After the Financial Crisis
versus Before and After the Policy Shift
The rst experiment we conduct is on how the parameter estimates change before and
after the policy shift. Before we get to the policy shift, we rst examine how the para-
meter estimates change before and after the nancial crisis while the policy rule remains
unchanged. The pseudo-true values (bprivAM ) and the associated standard errors for each
subsamples are shown in columns (1) and (2) of Table 7. Posterior standard errors are
15We assume that the policymaker has perfect knowledge of their own policy. Thus the policy para-
meters are dropped from its estimation.
16In practice we generated 550,000 sample periods, then discarded the rst 50,000 in order to ensure
that initial conditions have worn o¤.
17In reality, policymakers also face issues of estimation uncertainty and the identication problem. See
An and Schorfheide (2007) and Canova and Sala (2009) for discussions.
18See An and Schorfheide (2007) for more discussion on the use of the Bayesian method.
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driven down to near zero in both cases due to the large sample size.19 The oldestimates
are identical to the values used in the DGM. This is because, as implied by Equation (2),
the zero credit market friction makes the credit channel irrelevant to the model outcome
in the DGM. Thus the NK-AM perfectlyapproximates the unknown FA-DGM. In col-
umn (2), the newestimates are obtained under a positive credit market friction. Many
parameter estimates now change: most notable ones are the labor supply elasticity 
(from 1 to 1.63), the government expenditure shock G (from 0.01 to 0.014), and the
risk aversion  (from 1 to 1.17). The change in the risk aversion is non-trivial because
it implies that household perceived welfare cost of the business cycle increases by 17%
(Lucas, 1987). While these three parameters are loosely related to the credit channel, we
also observe changes in the price stickiness parameter  (from 0.55 to 0.52) that are more
di¢ cult to justify. This change in the price stickiness implies that the slope parameter
 in Equation (6) increases by 22%, partially o¤setting the atter Phillips curve through
reation. When the policymaker observes this, it might wrongly conclude that the current
monetary policy is not expansionary enough.
Next, we examine whether the parameters remain invariant before and after the policy
shift. Using data generated from the reationary policy, the policymaker obtains the
nalestimates reported in column (3) of Table 7. Again due to the misspecication,
these estimates have changed from the newestimates in column (2). In particular, two
parameters stand out: one is the labor elasticity parameter  that increases from 1.63 to
2.78 and the other is the price stickiness parameter  that decreases from 0.52 to 0.49.
We regard these changes as non-trivial, because it matches the magnitude of the crisis
scenario in which the credit market friction increases from 0 to 0.073. The further fall
in the price stickiness could be of particular concern to the policymaker, because such a
change further steepens the slope of the Phillips curve . Under the nalestimate the
value for  is 0.36. This is even larger than the pre-crisis value of 0.31.
19An exception is the labor supply elasticity, which is caused by the inherent identication problem
common in the baseline NK-AM. Cogley and Yagihashi (2010) conduct a separate simulation exercise
that shows this weak identication does not a¤ect the results on our parameter invariance problem.
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Empirically, the price stickiness is found to be negatively correlated with ination
(e.g. Fernandez-Villaverde and Rubio-Ramirez, 2007). While our result is consistent with
this empirical nding, we emphasize that the change in  in our case was purely caused
by the misspecication in the credit channel. Cogley and Yagihashi (2010) examine the
misspecication in the Phillips curve and they nd that the policy shift does not a¤ect
price stickiness. This demonstrates that the parameter invariance problem is context-
specic.
3.3 Parameter Invariance and the Central Banks Belief
The second experiment examines how the changes in parameters collectively a¤ect policy
outcomes evaluated using the approximating model. Based on our model setting, the
policymakers belief with regard to its own policy is formed through observing the
single loss measure in Equation (4), which captures the stabilization e¤ect on ination
and output. The calculation of the loss measure uses the estimated structural parameters
as input. Because the credit channel misspecication changes the parameter estimates
before and after the policy shift, the perceivedloss is likely to change as well.
For the purpose of clarication, we now rename the baseline reationary policy as
the NK-optimal policy, which is the rst-best policy according to the NK-AM. As
a competing policy we introduce the NK-suboptimal policy in which the policymaker
raises its target ination rate but ignores the newparameter estimates when calculating
the Taylor rule coe¢ cients. Because of informational constraint imposed on the NK-
suboptimal policy, the loss under this policy is expected to be larger than the loss in the
NK-optimal policy. A large di¤erence in the loss measure casts doubt on the use of the
approximating model.
Table 8 shows the result. The loss measure increases by 1.68% and 2.37% after the
policy shift under the NK-optimal policy (column 1) and the NK-suboptimal policy (col-
umn 2), respectively. To put these numbers into perspective, a reation from 2% to 3% is
associated with an additional loss of 2.5% as shown in Table 1. Thus the loss associated
with the credit channel misspecication is slightly smaller than the cost of a 1% higher
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ination.
The small di¤erence in losses can be explained by the similarity of the Taylor rule coef-
cients across policies. As the top two rows of Table 8 show, both policies have zero output
reaction coe¢ cients and only a small di¤erence in the ination reaction coe¢ cients. The
Taylor rule coe¢ cients are not a¤ected by much because the overall parameter changes
after the nancial crisis are not large. As a result, the change in the loss measure under
the NK-optimal policy becomes trivial.
This experiment demonstrates that the NK-AM is quite robust to the credit channel
misspecication when used together with the policy rule considered in this paper. As a
result, the e¤ect on the policymakers own assessment about the policy outcome remains
relatively small.
3.4 Optimal Policy in the FA-DGM
The last experiment asks whether the policymaker can use the AM as a guide to reduce the
loss measure evaluated in the data-generating model. Chang, Kim and Schorfheide (2010)
provide an example in which model misspecications induce the scal policymaker to
adopt a policy associated with an adverse welfare outcome. We are interested in whether
the same could occur in the case of the credit channel misspecication.
We introduce two policies that help us in assessing the performance of the baseline
NK-optimal policy. The rst policy treats the FA-DGM as unknown as before, but we give
the policymaker an opportunity to reoptimize its policy based on the parameter estimates
obtained after the policy shift. We call this policy the NK-reoptimized policy. If this
reoptimized policy yields a larger loss than the loss in the NK-optimal policy, we interpret
this as the policymaker being misguided by its own model. In this case, the use of the
NK-AM should be avoided.
The second policy treats the FA-DGM as known to the policymaker. The Taylor rule
coe¢ cients are thus obtained by minimizing the loss criterion using the FA-DGM. We call
this policy the FA-optimalpolicy. By construction, this policy will yield the lowest loss
possible evaluated using the FA-DGM. This is used to measure the opportunity cost of
17
using the misspecied model when the credit channel model is used to generate the data.
Table 9 shows how the losses compare under the three policies. We note that the
NK-reoptimized policy has a smaller loss than the NK-optimized policy, even though the
di¤erence is tiny (-0.07%). This means that the NK-AM is almost neutral in choosing
a policy evaluated in the unknown FA-DGM. Compared to the FA-optimal policy, both
the NK-optimal and the NK-reoptimized policies perform signicantly worse. Their loss
measures are more than 10% higher than the loss under the FA-optimal policy.
These di¤erences in losses can be again attributed to the di¤erences in the Taylor rule
coe¢ cients. Coe¢ cients for the FA-optimal policy are much larger than those generated
using the NK-optimal policy. This is because the FA-optimal policy tries to counter the
uctuation caused by the nancial accelerator mechanism.
One might wonder whether it is possible to improve upon the NK-optimal policy to
get closer to the FA-optimal policy. Figure 2 draws a contour map of the loss measure
for possible combinations of  and Y . The numbers associated with each contour are
normalized so that the FA-optimal rule produces a relative loss of one.20 The NK-optimal
policy is depicted as a dot in the south-west corner. We observe that once the dot
moves towards the north-east direction, the loss quickly starts to fall, meaning that the
potential gain from using a better approximating model is large. However, the strongly
skewed shape of the contour map also shows that the di¢ culty of achieving a better policy
outcome in the post-crisis economy. For example, if the policymaker were to simply raise
 while keeping Y xed, that would deviate the policy away from the FA-optimal policy.
On the other hand, raising Y while keeping  xed would soon hit the indeterminacy
region, which is clearly suboptimal.
This experiment demonstrates that the NK-AM does not necessarily induce the policy-
maker to pick a bad policy when the credit channel misspecication is present. However
the model also does very little in further reducing the loss measure. To signicantly
improve the policy outcome, the policymaker needs to be equipped with a model that
features the nancial accelerator mechanism.
20The contour lines also represent gross deviations from the FA-optimal policy.
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4 Robustness Checks
4.1 The Role of Credit Market Friction
In the benchmark FA-DGM, the set of credit channel parameters are specically calibrated
using historical data in the United States during 1988Q1-2009Q2. One might be interested
in how the NK-AM performs when di¤erent credit market frictions are assumed. The size
of the credit market friction enhances the response of output and ination through the risk
premium. This implies that a higher friction may cause more changes in the estimated
parameters.
For this experiment, we examine two scenarios, modestperiod and disasterperiod,
in addition to the baselineperiod that we used in the previous analysis. The modest
period features a lower credit market friction whereas the crisis period features a higher
credit market friction than the baseline. They imply di¤erent steady-state risk premiums,
default rates, and leverage ratios as summarized in Table 10. The modestcase is close
to Bernanke et al (1999)s baseline parameterization which does not include the period
of 2007-09 nancial crisis.
Table 11 shows the estimation result. To save space, we only report the changes in
the estimated parameters before and after the policy shift.21 For the modest period
case in column (2), many of the parameters stay invariant relative to the baseline case.
In the disasterperiod (column (3)), the parameter changes are similar to the baseline.
One notable di¤erence is price stickiness, which falls twice as much in the disaster period
compared to the baseline, making the Phillips curve much steeper from the pre-crisis
level. In most cases, the direction of change is monotonically related to the credit market
friction, with the exceptions of the labor supply elasticity and the size of technology shock.
Overall we nd similar results as our baseline that the changes in parameters as a whole
is rather limited.
21For the baseline case, this is equivalent to the gap between column (2) and (3) of Table 7.
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4.2 An Alternative Credit Channel Model
Next, we consider a di¤erent DGM that features a di¤erent type of credit channel. Re-
cently there is a heightened interest among policymakers in explicitly modeling the bank-
ing sector, which is absent in the FA model. Works by Curdia and Woodford (2010),
Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010), and Gertler and Karadi (2011) have gained much popularity
within the central banking community. The main benet of their models is that it can be
used to analyze the economic e¤ect of injecting liquidity into the banking sector.
We choose the model of Gertler and Karadi (2011) as our benchmark DGM (hereafter
the GK model). This model introduces an incentive misalignment problem between the
depositors and the banks: the bank owners have incentives to terminate their businesses
and run away with the deposited funds. In order to keep them in the business, su¢ ciently
high returns have to be provided in the form of spread Rk R. When such incentive con-
straint is binding, there will be an endogenously determined leverage ratio that constrains
how much the bank capital QK can be expanded relative to the bank net worth N . This
function of the GK model is qualitatively similar to the nancial accelerator mechanism
in the earlier model.
The GK model has seven equations in addition to those of the NK model. Two
equations are of particular importance. The rst equation represents the value of capital,
or more specically, the time t opportunity cost of terminating the business evaluated in
terms of banks capital,
t = Et









where  represents the exogenous survival rate of the bankers. The second equation
represents the value of net worth, or the opportunity cost of terminating the business in
terms of banks net worth,
t = Et









Banks optimally choose their leverage QK=N so that the total opportunity cost of ter-
minating the business tQtKt+1 + tNt is equal to the amount of funds that they could
20
potentially divert. The remaining equations in the GK models are shown in Appendix
B.22
Although the credit channel is modeled di¤erently in the GK model and the FA model,
our simulation results are strikingly similar to those of the FA-DGM on how the parameter
estimates change across policy shifts. We apply the same reationary policy shift that was
applied in the previous experiment. The new results are summarized in Table 12. The
column newshows the pseudo-true values before the policy shift. We note that many
parameter estimates are quite di¤erent from the parameters used in the DGM. When
compared to the FA-DGM case (Table 7), the risk aversion parameter  and the capital
adjustment cost parameter  show much larger asymptotic biases this time. It conrms
the obvious fact that the two models are inherently di¤erent in structure.
The next column nalshows the pseudo-true values after the policy shift. Again,
the asymptotic biases are estimated to be large. However, when we look at the direction
of the parameter change, eight out of ten changes are in the same direction as in the FA-
DGM case. Specically, the price stickiness falls by a signicant margin, which conrms
our previous nding.
This experiment demonstrates that even though di¤erent DGM generates di¤erent
estimates in the AM, the changes in parameters are intimately related to the nature of
the type of model misspecication. Thus the main result of our paper may be extended to
a wide variety of credit channel models, including those that involves the explicit banking
sector.
5 Conclusion
This paper examines the parameter invariance problem of the workhorse DSGE model
when a misspecication occurs in the credit channel. The nancial accelerator model is
chosen to represent the complicated reality and the simpler new-Keynesian model is used
as the estimating model by the policymaker. A reationary monetary policy that involves
22We also apply the same parameter values as in Gertler and Karadi (2011).
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an increase in the target ination is simulated using estimated structural parameters. We
nd that after the policy shift, both labor supply elasticity and price stickiness fail to
remain invariant due to model misspecication. While the additional exercises demon-
strates the relative robustness of the simpler new Keynesian model, it also shows that
there is much room left in improving the policy outcome through correctly specifying
the credit channel in the estimation model. Finally, the paper examines how the new
Keynesian model performs under a di¤erent degree of credit market friction and under
an alternative data-generating credit channel model. We nd that much of the baseline
results hold in these cases as well.
In the empirical context, our ndings provide an alternative explanation to what the
literature regard as the parameter instability problem associated with DSGE models. For
example, Smets and Wouters (2005), Fernandez-Villaverde and Rubio-Ramirez (2007),
and Canova (2009) report that the estimated structural parameters in DSGE models look
quite di¤erent for di¤erent subsamples that are split by a historically well-known policy
shift. The result of this paper suggests that the parameter instability could possibly be
caused by the lack of the credit channel in the estimation model.
In the experiments, we kept the model relatively small in favor of transparency. A
possible extension to our paper is to repeat the exercise with a larger model a la Smets
and Wouters (2003) with more structural model equations. This would introduce addi-
tional cross-equations restrictions in the model that generates new tensions between the
estimating model and the generated data. It would be interesting to see whether the labor
supply elasticity and price stickiness parameter in the new setting will be a¤ected in an
non-trivial manner, as we see in this paper.




[1] An, Sungbae and Frank Schorfheide (2007), Bayesian Analysis of DSGE Models,
Econometric Reviews, vol.26, pp113-172.
[2] Bakhshi, Hasan, Hashmat Khan, Pablo Burriel-Llombart, and Barbara Rudolf
(2007), The New Keynesian Phillips Curve under Trend Ination and Strategic
Complementarity,Journal of Macroeconomics, vol.29, pp37-59.
[3] Bayoumi, Tamim, Douglas Laxton, Hamid Faruqee, Benjamin Hunt, Philippe Karam,
Jaewoo Lee, Alessandro Rebucci, and Ivan Tchakarov, (2004), GEM: A New Inter-
national Macroeconomic Model, International Monetary Fund Occasional Paper,
No. 239.
[4] Bernanke, Ben S., Mark Gertler and Simon Gilchrist (1999), The Financial Acceler-
ator in a Quantitative Business Cycle Framework,in Handbook of Macroeconomics,
eds. by John Taylor and Michael Woodford, Amsterdam: Elsevier Science, pp1341-
1393.
[5] Blanchard, Olivier, Giovanni DellAriccia, and Paolo Mauro (2010), Rethinking
Macroeconomic Policy, Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, vol.42(supp.1),
pp199-215.
[6] Caballero, J. Ricardo (2010), Macroeconomics after the Crisis: Time to Deal with
the Pretense-of-Knowledge Syndrome, Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol.24,
no.4, pp85-102.
[7] Calvo, Guillermo A. (1983), Staggered Prices in a Utility-maximizing Framework,
Journal of Monetary Economics, vol.12, pp983-998.
[8] Canova, Fabio (2009), What Explains the Great Moderation in the U.S.? A Struc-
tural Analysis,Journal of the European Economic Association, vol.7(4), pp697-721.
[9] Canova, Fabio and Luca Sala (2009), Back to Square One: Identication Issues in
DSGE Models,Journal of Monetary Economics, vol.56, pp431-449.
[10] Chang, Yonsung, Sun-Bin Kim, and Frank Schorfheide (2010), Labor-Market Het-
erogeneity, Aggregation, and the Lucas Critique,University of Pennsylvania, Uni-
versity of Rochester, Yonsei University, mimeo.
[11] Coenen, Guenter, Peter McAdam, and Roland Straub (2007), Tax Reform and
Labour-market Performance in the Euro Area: A Simulation-based Analysis Using
the New Area-Wide Model,Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, vol.32(8),
pp2543-2583.
23
[12] Cogley, Timothy and Takeshi Yagihashi (2010), Are DSGE Approximating Mod-
els Invariant to Shifts in Policy?The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics, vol.10(1)
(Contributions), Article 27.
[13] Cúrdia, Vasco and Michael Woodford (2010), Credit Spreads and Monetary Policy,
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, vol.42(s1), pp3-35.
[14] Erceg, Christopher J., Luca Guerrieri, and Christopher Gust (2006), SIGMA: A
New Open Economy Model for Policy Analysis, International Journal of Central
Banking, vol.2, pp1-50.
[15] Evans, Charles L. (2011), The Feds Dual Mandate Responsibilities: Maintaining
Credibility During a Time of Immense Economic Challenges,a speech delivered on
October 17, 2011 at the Michigan Council on Economic Education, Federal Reserve
Bank of Chicago, IL.
[16] Faust, Jon (2012), DSGEModels: I smell a Rat (and It Smells Good),International
Journal of Central Banking, vol.8, iss.1, pp53-64.
[17] Fernandez-Villaverde, Jesus and Juan F. Rubio-Ramirez (2007), How Structural are
Structural Parameters?2007 NBER Macroeconomics Annual vol.22, eds. by Daron
Acemoglu, Rogo¤, Kenneth, and Michael Woodford, Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, pp83-132.
[18] Gelman, A, J.B. Carlin, H.S. Stern, and D.B. Rubin (2000), Bayesian Data Analysis,
London:Chapman and Hall.
[19] Gertler, Mark and Peter Karadi (2011), A Model of Unconventional Monetary Pol-
icy,Journal of Monetary Economics, vol.58(1), pp17-34.
[20] Gertler, Mark, Nobuhiko Kiyotaki (2010), Financial Intermediation and Credit Pol-
icy in Business Cycle Analysis, in: Benjamin M. Friedman, Michael Woodford
(Eds.), Handbook of Monetary Economics. Amsterdam: Elsevier, pp547-599.
[21] Goodfriend, Marvin, and Bennett T. McCallum (2007), Banking and Interest Rates
in Monetary Policy Analysis: A Quantitative Exploration, Journal of Monetary
Economics, vol.54, pp1480-1507.
[22] Harrison, Richard, Kalin Nikolov, Meghan Quinn, Gareth Ramsay, Alasdair Scott
and Ryland Thomas (2005), The Bank of England Quarterly Model, London: Bank
of England.
[23] Iacoviello, Matteo (2005), House Prices, Borrowing Constraints and Monetary Pol-
icy in the Business Cycle,American Economic Review, vol.95(3), pp739-764.
24
[24] Leeper, Eric M. and Christopher A. Sims (1994), Toward a Modern Macroeconomic
Model Usable for Policy Analysis, NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1994, vol.9, eds.
by Stanley Fischer and Julio J. Rotemberg, Massachusetts: MIT Press, pp81-140.
[25] Lubik, Thomas A. and Paolo Surico (2010), The Lucas Critique and the Stability
of Empirical Models,Journal of Applied Econometrics, vol.25, pp177-194.
[26] Lucas, Robert E., Jr. (1976), Econometric Policy Evaluation: A Critique,in The
Phillips Curve and Labor Markets, Carnegie-Rochester Series on Public Policy, vol.1,
eds. by K. Brunner and A. Meltzer, Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Com-
pany, pp.103-130.
[27] Lucas, Robert E., Jr. (1987), Models of Business Cycles, Oxford; New York: B.
Blackwell.
[28] Mishkin, Fredrick (2008), Monetary Policy Flexibility, Risk Management, and Fi-
nancial Disruptions,speech at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York on January
11, 2008, Federal Reserve System.
[29] Rudebusch, Glenn D. (2005), Assessing the Lucas Critique in Monetary Policy
Models,Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, vol.37(2), pp245-272.
[30] Sahuc, Jean-Guillaume (2006), Partial Indexation, Trend Ination, and the Hybrid
Phillips Curve,Economics Letters, vol.90, pp42-50.
[31] Smets, Frank and Rafael Wouters (2003), An Estimated Stochastic Dynamic Gen-
eral Equilibrium Model of the Euro Area,Journal of European Economic Associa-
tion, vol.1, pp1123-1175.
[32] Smets, Frank and Rafael Wouters (2005), Comparing Shocks and Frictions in US
and Euro Area Business Cycles: A Bayesian DSGE Approach,Journal of Applied
Econometrics, vol.20, pp161-183.
[33] Taylor, John B. (1993), Discretion Versus Policy Rules in Practice, Carnegie-
Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, vol.39, pp195-214.
[34] Williams, John (2009), Heeding Daedalus: Optimal Ination and the Zero Lower
Bound,Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Fall 2009, pp1-37.
[35] Yagihashi, Takeshi (2011), Estimating Taylor Rules in a Credit Channel Environ-
ment,North American Journal of Economics and Finance, vol.22, pp344-364.
[36] Yun, Tack (1996), Nominal Price Rigidity, Money Supply Endogeneity, and Business
Cycles,Journal of Monetary Economics, vol.37, pp345-370.
25
Appendix A: Computing the Optimal Policy
Our hypothetical central banker chooses policy parameters ; y so that it minimizes
the expected (discounted) quadratic loss subject to the law of motion of the NK model









st+1 = 	1st +	2et+1 et v iidN(0;)
where   = [b; bY ]0 is the vector of ination and output that enters the loss function
and W = [
1 0
0 wy
] is the weight matrix that denes the relative importance of the
stabilization component to the policymaker.23 On the constraint side, Y is the vector of
all variables, s is the vector of predetermined endogenous variables and e is the vector
of exogenous shocks. ;	1;	2 are time-invariant coe¢ cient matrices that include policy





Next, we conjecture a quadratic value function that takes the form of







then we use the reduced form to replace st+1, we obtain
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. It follows that the value function can be expressed as
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Equating powers of st yields
P = R+ 	01P	1:
This Ricatti Equation has a unique solution P. We can further solve for  by equating
the constant terms of the value function
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For any given initial value of s = s0; there exists an optimal monetary policy that solves




where we use the steady state values as our initial values.
Appendix B: Model of Gertler and Karadi (2011)
The new model adds seven equations to the NK-AM. These are as follows 24
t = Et
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= (Rk;t+1  Rt+1)t +Rt+1 (B-4)
Nt = Ne;t +Nn;t (B-5)








Nn;t = (1  )'QtKt: (B-7)
Equation (B-1) and (B-2) represent the value of capital and net worth, as explained in
the main text. Equation (B-3) denes the optimal leverage ratio  for the bank.  is the
fraction of funds that the banker can divert from the deposit. Equation (B-4) is the law
of motion for the aggregate net worth. Equation (B-5) denes the aggregate net worth,
which consists of the net worth of the existing banks Ne and the net worth of the newly
entering banks Nn. Equation (B-6) is the law of motion for the net worth Ne. Equation
(B-7) describes the start-up funds for the new banks. ' is the fraction of capital that is
transferred.
28
Table 1: Target Ination and Monetary Policy
(Annual) Target ination ss  4   1 2% 3% 5% 7%
Slope of NKPC  0.31 0.28 0.23 0.18
Taylor rule coe¢ cient: ination  4.05 3.19 2.03 1.88
Taylor rule coe¢ cient: output gap Y 0.37 0.19 0 0
Loss Measure WL 7.6673 7.8592 8.2762 8.7843
% from ss =2% - 2.5% 7.9% 14.6%
Note: the unit of loss measure is 1E-4 = 0.0001. NK-AM is used for calculation
Table 2: Estimated Parameters
Parameter name Values
Risk aversion  1
Labor supply elasticity  1
Capital adjustment cost  0.25
Price stickiness  0.55
Persistence of tech. shock A 0.9
Persistence of gov. shock G 0.9
Size of tech. shock A 0.01
Size of gov. shock G 0.01
Size of cost push shock cp 0.01
Size of mon. policy shock m 0.01
Table 3: Other Structural Parameters
Parameter name Values
Discount factor  = 1=R 0.99
Capital share  0.33
Elasticity of demand  11
Government spending share of output G=Y 0.21
Entrepreneurs share of output Ce=Y 0.01
Depreciation rate  0.025
Credit market friction v 0.073
Survival rate of entrepreneur  0.973
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Table 4: Policy Parameters
(1) Low ination (2) Reationary
policy policy
(Annual) Target ination SS  4   1 2% 5%
Taylor rule coe¢ cient: ination  4.05 2.24
Taylor rule coe¢ cient: output gap Y 0.37 0
cf. Credit market friction 0 0.073
Table 5: Steady-state Values
(1) FA (2) NK
model model
Credit market friction  0.073 0
Consumption spending share of output C=Y 0.64 0.59
Investment spending share of output I=Y 0.16 0.21
(Annual) Capital output ratio K=4Y 1.6 2.1
(Annual) Ex ante real return on capital (R
k
)4 1.088 1.043
(Annual) Risk premium (R
k
)4  R4 4.5% 0%
(Annual) Default rate F (!) 6.3% 0%
Leverage ratio QK=N 1.8 1
Table 6: Priors
Distribution Mode 95% credible set
Risk aversion  Gamma 1 [0.523, 2.087]
Labor supply elasticity  Gamma 1 [0.523, 2.087]
Capital adjustment cost  Gamma 0.25 [0.133, 0.438]
Price stickiness  Beta 0.55 [0.197, 0.851]
Persistence of tech. shock A Beta 0.9 [0.635, 0.967]
Persistence of gov. shock G Beta 0.9 [0.635, 0.967]
Size of tech. shock A Inv-Gamma 0.01 [0.006, 0.084]
Size of gov. shock G Inv-Gamma 0.01 [0.006, 0.084]
Size of cost push shock cp Inv-Gamma 0.01 [0.006, 0.084]
Size of mon. policy shock m Inv-Gamma 0.01 [0.006, 0.084]
Note: the 95% credible set is calculated as the highest posterior density
interval from the random draws.
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Table 7: Parameter Estimates
DGM Estimates
values (1)old (2)new (3)nal




























































cf. credit market friction in DGM  - 0 0.073 0.073
Note: Posterior standard errors are shown in parentheses.
Table 8: Losses in the Approximating Model
(1) NK- (2) NK-
optimal suboptimal
Taylor rule coe¢ cient: ination  2.24 2.03
Taylor rule coe¢ cient: output gap Y 0 0
(a) WL under newestimates 11.0674 11.0730
(b) WL under nalestimates 11.2539 11.3355
% from (a) to (b) +1.68% +2.37%
Note: target ination is set to 5%. The unit of the loss measure is 1E-4 = 0.0001.
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Table 9: Losses in the Data-generating Model
(1) FA- (2) NK- (3) NK-
optimal optimal reoptimized
Taylor rule coe¢ cient: ination  8.61 2.24 2.20
Taylor rule coe¢ cient: output gap Y 3.33 0 0
Loss measure WL 8.5121 9.3921 9.3859
% from NK-optimal case -9.37% - -0.07%
% from FA-optimal case - +10.34% +10.27%
Note: target ination is set to 5%. The unit of the loss measure is 1E-4 = 0.0001.
Table 10: Steady-state Values, with Di¤erent Credit Market Friction
(1) Base- (2) Modest (3) Disaster
line period period
Credit market friction parameter  0.073 0.056 0.127
Consumption spending share of output C=Y 0.64 0.63 0.66
Investment spending share of output I=Y 0.16 0.17 0.14
(Annual) Capital output ratio K=4Y 1.6 1.7 1.4
(Annual) Ex ante real return on capital (R
k
)4 1.088 1.077 1.116
(Annual) Risk premium (R
k
)4  R4 4.5% 3.5% 7.4%
(Annual) Default rate F (!) 6.3% 5.8% 7.7%
Leverage ratio QK=N 1.8 1.9 1.6
Note: the case with baseline parameterization in Table 2, 3 is named as the baseline.
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Table 11: Changes in Estimates, with Di¤erent Credit Market Friction
(1) Base- (2) Modest (3) Disaster
line period period
Risk aversion   0:024  0:015  0:028
Labor supply elasticity  +1:150  0:006 +0:472
Capital adjustment cost   0:004  0:003  0:005
Price stickiness   0:027 +0:001  0:054
Persistence of tech. shock A +0:004 0:000 +0:004
Persistence of gov. shock G  0:001 0:000  0:005
Size of tech. shock A  0:0002  0:0001  0:0001
Size of gov. shock G +0:0015 +0:0013 +0:0015
Size of cost push shock cp +0:0001 0:0000 +0:0001
Size of mon. policy shock m 0:0000 0:0000 0:0000
cf. credit market friction in DGM  0.073 0.056 0.127
Note: each number represents the change from the newestimate to the
nalestimate.
Table 12: Parameter Estimates, with Di¤erent Credit Channel Model
DGM GK Estimates Changes
values new nal GK cf. BGG















































































































Figure 1: Impulse Responses to an 1% Expansionary Monetary Policy Shock: zero credit
market friction with low ination (Dotted line), positive credit market friction with low
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Figure 2: Isoloss Contour Map Showing Relative Loss Under Di¤erent Policies: the num-
bers in the gure are normalized so that the FA-optimal rule produces a relative loss of
one and the contour lines represent gross deviations from the FA-optimal policy.
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